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ABSTRACT 
 
What determines conventional and unconventional modes of political participation? 
Are they equally and positively related to social status and education? There are several 
factors that explain these two modes of participation.  Using data collected under this study, 
UNDP data, and interviews, this thesis explains the factors that determine political 
participation in Kosovo. Eight hypotheses are tested, using both bivariate correlations and 
logistic regression analyses. Results indicate that party membership and social networks are 
very important in explaining both conventional and unconventional political participation in 
Kosovo. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION  
 
“The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class 
accent." 
- E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People 
 
This quote by Schattschneider reveals a truth about the pluralist system democracy, and 
who actually has the voice in this system. Discourse on democracy has oftentimes been served to 
us by portraying all of us as equal. However, the truth is that we might be equal in theory, but not 
in practice. We may have the right to participate politically, but oftentimes, we lack the resources 
to participate. For several years, only institutionalized forms such as voting have been seen as 
democratic practices, and they have favored the upper class that has had better access to 
information. Democracy, however, has been reinvented and is still being reinvented, and the 
political repertoire of participation is expanding. What once was seen as undemocratic now is 
being seen as democratic.  
Dating back to ancient Greece we know that political participation was determined by 
sex, wealth, and age; one had to be a male adult who owned land. As democracy has evolved, 
different factors influencing political participation have been examined. The research literature 
asserts that different countries show different patterns and different factors have different effects 
on political participation. There isn’t one theory or specific variable that explains political 
behavior; every country has its own specifications.  
In Kosovo, there has been no research concerning factors that motivate people to 
participate politically. There have only been polls that measure public opinion regarding political 
2 
 
 
issues, but no correlational research. This study aims to expand the research on political behavior 
in developing countries, specifically Kosovo, and to understand the patterns of political behavior 
there. The objective of this study is to uncover information on political behavior in Kosovo and 
to have a better understanding as to which factors lead to political participation in the light of its 
historical context. 
 
Research Questions 
 As the objective of this research is to shed light on political behavior in Kosovo, the 
following research questions are posed: 
R1: What factors influence political participation in Kosovo?  
R1.1: Does the high unemployment rate and potential resulting citizen 
dissatisfaction affect protest participation?  
R1.2: Do resources affect conventional and unconventional political 
participation? 
R1.3: Does grievance outweigh resource mobilization in unconventional political 
participation in Kosovo?  
R1.4: What is the role of nationalism in mobilizing people to participate 
politically in Kosovo?   
 
To answer these questions, I have used both quantitative and qualitative methods. For my 
quantitative methods I have used data from the Kosovo Public Policy Pulse (October, 2015), and 
I have also collected a small sample of survey data in the capital city of Kosovo, Prishtina.  To 
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complement my quantitative methods, I have conducted interviews with a small purposive expert 
sample. 
 
Thesis Content 
Chapter 2 will cover the historical context of Kosovo, which is critically important to 
understanding political participation. Chapter 3 will review relevant research literature covering 
various theories of political participation along with overviewing political participation research 
that has been conducted in various countries. Chapter 3 will also describe my hypotheses. 
Chapter 4 will describe the methodology that was used to conduct this research. Finally, Chapter 
5 will cover the results of my data analysis and the limitations of this research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
Kosovo, with an area of 4,200 square miles and 1.7 million people, is located in the 
southeast of Europe and is a relatively new country, whose existence has been shaped by much 
political turmoil. Kosovo remained under political authority of either Yugoslavia or Serbia until 
1999, when the United Nations assumed that authority.  
During the era under the Serbian regime Kosovo wasn’t equally recognized as a republic 
of Yugoslavia, like Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. Kosovo was an 
autonomous province under Serbia; therefore, it didn’t have rights equal to those of other 
republics. In 1989 the autonomy of the Province of Kosovo was annulled. Most Kosovo 
Albanians were no longer allowed to work in the public sector. Kosovo Albanians were excluded 
from schools and universities, health services, etc. Kosovo Albanians established a parallel 
political and economic system of their own, where they started schooling in Albanian, created an 
informal governance and taxation system as a means to resist the Milosevic regime’s 
suppression, and Albanian doctors provided health services in their private houses (Clark, 2000). 
This period was characterized by much political turmoil and activism; several organizations were 
formed, including the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms. The Democratic 
League of Kosovo became a dominant force in the political scene and many Albanians became 
involved in street protests (i.e., Trepca miners started a strike, etc.) (Clark, 2000). Slobodan 
Milosevic claimed that Kosovo’s autonomy had to be annulled to protect the Serbian minority in 
Kosovo. He declared a state of emergency in Kosovo due to protests.  
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In 1990, Serbian authorities abolished the Kosovo Assembly. Kosovo Albanians 
organized against Milosevic’s decisions by declaring the independence of Kosovo within 
Yugoslavia on July 2
nd
, 1990. Consequently, police repression intensified. Albanians held 
unofficial elections in 1992 for an assembly and president of the Republic of Kosovo. These 
attempts proved unsuccessful, as oppression increased more and more. As the situation was 
getting worse and Serbian forces took control over all the Kosovo territory and conflict erupted, 
a guerrilla force known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was founded. The KLA made 
their first appearance in 1997. The war broke off in 1998 after the Drenica massacre where 60 
members of the Jashari family were killed. Adem Jashari, member of the Jashari family, was one 
of the founders of the KLA. After several attempts to capture Adem Jashari, Serbian paramilitary 
forces launched an attack against his home and committed the massacre. When the conflict 
radicalized, the international community intervened to prevent further violence (Visoka, 2011). 
The North Atlantic Pact tried to solve the conflict with peace talks held in Rambouillet, France. 
When the peace talks negotiated by NATO failed, NATO started a bombing campaign in Serbia. 
The military intervention was followed with an international civilian presence called the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), who exercised executive power 
such as agenda setting power, veto powers, and drafting of legislation (Visoka, 2011) until 
February 2008 when Kosovo declared its independence. However, international supervision in 
Kosovo lasted until September 2012.  
During the post-war period, characterized by international civilian presence, there was 
not much space left for Kosovo citizens to participate in the political processes. Political 
participation shifted from peaceful resistance during the early 1990s to rebellion and armed 
conflict during the late 1990s.  The 1990s were characterized by collective attempts to create a 
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nation-state, and this changed to low political participation during the decade of the international 
presence in Kosovo.  
 
Kosovo – Serbia Negotiations 
Facilitated by the European Union, Kosovo and Serbia started negotiations, or so-called 
“technical dialogue,” in 2011. These negotiations resulted in eight rounds and some agreements 
on regional cooperation, freedom of movement, and rule of law. Even then however, Serbia 
didn’t recognize Kosovo as an independent country, and recognized it as part of Serbia within its 
constitution.  
The technical dialogues were followed by the 2013 Brussels Agreement which aimed to 
normalize Kosovo-Serbia relations. This agreement contained 15 points, including the creation 
of the Association of Serbian Municipalities. This association, which aims to integrate Kosovo 
Serbs into Kosovo institutions, should have a president, an assembly, and its own police forces 
and police commander, with the membership limited only to ethnic Serbs. The association will 
be funded by the central (Kosovo) authority as well as by the Serbian authority.  
 
Current Situation 
Although Kosovo has declared its independence since 2008, the country is still going 
through the democratization process. As per the 2015 Freedom House Report, Kosovo is 
recognized as partially free. The progress that has been made until today is not to be neglected. 
However, the non-democratic nature of the international administration (Cocozzelli, 2013) and 
the succession of corrupt governments since the declaration of the independence inhibited proper 
democratic consolidation in Kosovo.  
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Citizen satisfaction with the government has declined over the years. A biannual poll 
done by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Kosovo shows that only 15% of 
respondents are satisfied with the Prime Minister’s performance in 2016. Satisfaction with other 
governmental branches is not higher than 20%.  
In the June 2014 legislative elections, when the ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo 
(PDK) won the most votes, opposition parties–including the self-identified anti-establishment 
movement, Lëvizja Vetevendosje (LVV); the first party formed during the 1998-1999 Kosovo 
and Serbia war, Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK); and two smaller parties, namely, Aleanca 
per Ardhmërinë e Kosovës (AAK) and Nisma-unified with the aim of toppling the PDK-ruled 
government. The legislative branch faced great challenges and it was unable to complete the 
parliamentary procedures to hold session for a 6-month period. The new government was only 
formed in February 2015, when LDK broke the deal with the rest of the opposition parties and 
joined in coalition with PDK. Therefore, PDK and LDK formed the government, having the 
majority of the seats in the parliament, counting the votes of the Serbian minorities (Lista 
Srpska).
1
 The following months were characterized by greater political challenges in ratifying 
laws that have invaluable importance for the state of Kosovo, such as the Special Court for War 
Crimes and the Association of Serbian Municipalities. These events were followed by massive 
emigration. The police estimated that the number of people Kosovo lost in the two-month period 
after the elections was approximately 50,000. A poll conducted by UNDP states that of 
respondents who had at least one family member or friend who had emigrated, the majority 
believed that migration occurred due to poor socio-economic conditions. Forty-five percent of 
                                                 
1
 Of the 120 seats in the parliament of the Republic of Kosovo, 10 are reserved for Serbs. 
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respondents believed that unemployment is the main reason for emigration, followed by poverty 
as a second reason
 
 (UNDP Kosovo, 2015).  
After the failure of ratification on the first attempt in August 2015, with international 
pressure, the Kosovo Parliament ratified constitutional amendments that allowed the creation of 
a Special Court that would be mandated to investigate alleged war crimes committed from 1998 
to 1999. This court will operate with internationally appointed judges and prosecutors. The 
ratification of the constitutional amendments met contrasting reactions by the citizens of Kosovo. 
While there were people supporting the court with the hopes that war criminals will be 
prosecuted, protests were organized on the streets of Prishtina to oppose the creation of a Special 
Court. Citizens opposed the creation of this Court for various reasons. Some of the reasons, 
based on the declaration given by the LVV, who openly opposed it and based on declaration of 
Kosovo veterans, emphasize that this court undermines the war of Kosovo Liberation Army, and 
the state of justice in Kosovo.  
Recently the Parliament has tried to ratify the Association of Serbian Municipalities, 
which was required by the Brussels Agreement. So far this attempt has failed. The unified 
opposition parties initially blocked this attempt by throwing tear gas in the parliamentary 
sessions. The assembly then forbade the opposition parties from the parliamentary session and 
ratified the law on the creation of the Association of the Serbian Municipalities unanimously.  
The opposition then started a petition to counter the creation of this association and 
demarcation with Montenegro. A total of 200,000 citizens signed this petition. However, 
members of the opposition were stopped by security in their attempt to submit the petitions to the 
assembly. Later, the Speaker of the Assembly said that the opposition didn’t respect legal 
procedures in submitting the petition. On December 23, 2015, the Constitutional Court ruled that 
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on principal the creation of the Association of Serbian Municipalities was constitutional but that 
aspects of the ratified legislation were unconstitutional. Meanwhile, the opposition organized 
protests, which resulted in several arrests and violence. The biggest protest yet to be held after 
the war was that of January 9, 2016, organized by opposition parties against the government. 
The historical context of Kosovo is very important when talking about political 
participation. The collective memory of Kosovo Albanians has been shaped by their attempts to 
create and establish their own state. Hence, participation was a necessary tool to achieve the 
collective aspirations for a nation. A decade after the war and eight years after independence 
Kosovo still faces great socio-economic issues. While the official Statistical Agency of Kosovo 
states the unemployment rate in Kosovo is 35%, the World Bank states the figure as 47%. World 
Bank data also asserts that 45% of the population in Kosovo lives below the national poverty 
line, while 17% of the population lives in extreme poverty. Encountering these great economic 
challenges, having a very young population, and considering the historical context, one can see 
the importance of the political participation rooted in the culture of Kosovo.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Overview 
Much scholarly work has been conducted on democracy, but there is little agreement 
among scholars on the definition of democracy. Empirical data reveals that democracy has been 
invented and reinvented throughout the years (Dahl, 1998). Nevertheless, a very important 
component of democracy that most scholars agree upon is the necessity of political participation 
for its endurance and functionality. A country’s level of democracy is determined by the extent 
to which the state behaves in conformity to the demands of its citizens (Tilly, 2007); therefore, 
participation is a necessary and a required tool for an existing order of democracy (Dahl, 1998).  
However, quantitative data show an alarming decline in political participation through 
conventional channels in many countries (Norris, 2002). In aggregate, citizens are not interested 
in politics and only a minority of citizens participates actively in politics. However, the patterns 
of political behavior vary between countries, and no single theory explains it. Schlozman et al., 
(2012) give three reasons for the lack of civic participation in politics: citizens do not participate 
because a) they don’t want to, b) they can’t and c) because nobody asked them. It is evident that 
there is an underrepresentation of the disadvantaged (poor citizens) in political activities. Studies 
show that apart from being underrepresented, the disadvantaged have different policy concerns 
when compared to the advantaged (Verba et al., 1993). 
Various studies have been conducted examining the factors that motivate people to 
participate in political activities. Earlier studies measured political participation by accounting 
only for conventional modes, especially voting, as a basic tool used by citizens to convey their 
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political preferences. However, as modes of political activism have been reinvented, 
contemporary scholars have expanded their scope by accounting for unconventional forms of 
political participation as well. Besides conventional participation (voting and partisan 
participation such as donating money to parties, campaigning for a candidate, etc.) scholars have 
measured political participation using various other, unconventional, forms of political activities 
(protest, signing petitions, union membership, demonstrations, strikes, hanging posters, 
boycotting products for political reasons, etc.), ranging from peaceful activities to violent street 
blockades.  
Conventional political activities are voting, campaigning for political parties or 
candidates, and donating money to parties. Unconventional political activities are protesting, 
taking part in demonstrations or strikes, signing petitions, occupying buildings, and/or 
boycotting.   
The factors that lead people to participate politically are age, gender, socio-economic 
status, educational level, political information, ideology, risk attitudes, mobilization, and others. 
However, these factors have different effects in different countries. 
 
Levels of analysis 
Scholars researching political behavior focus on three levels of analysis; macro, micro, 
and multi-level analysis. In the macro level the authors concentrate on political systems and 
societal characteristics (Gabriel et al., 2012). In micro level analyses, authors focus on individual 
antecedents of individual political participation (Gabriel et al., 2012). Multilevel analysis focuses 
on individual characteristics within societal and institutional context (Gabriel et al., 2012). In 
micro level analysis, studies suggest that socio-economic status, race (Verba and Nie, 1972; 
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Schlozman et al., 2012; Smith-Lovin, 1979), age, education (Norris, 2002; Gallego, 2007; 
McVeigh and Smith 1999; Dalton et al., 2010), political information (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996), resources (Kaase, 2010), political ideology (Barnes and Kaase, 1979), networking 
(Beeghley, 1986), risk attitudes (Kam, 2012; Brooks, 2014), and mobilization (Verba et al., 
1978; Piven and Cloward, 1977) play an important role shaping and affecting political 
participation behavior. In this thesis, I focus on the micro level, and in particular on three 
approaches: the SES model, the rational choice model, and grievance theories. 
 
The SES Model 
The socio-economic status model (SES), one of the prominent theories in political 
behavior, tries to explain the causal relation between socio-economic status and political 
participation. This model measures civic orientation, consisting of psychological involvement in 
politics, a sense of political efficacy, information about politics, and sense of contribution to the 
community. Findings from empirical studies based on the SES model suggest that there is a 
significant linkage between civic orientation and upper-class status. Hence, citizens with higher 
SES are more likely to participate politically, because they have the necessary resources for 
political participation, such as, time, money, political skills, and political knowledge (Verba and 
Nie, 1972). Since these factors are distributed unequally, this contributes to unequal political 
voice (Schlozman et al., 2012). Another study points out that although the rich have higher 
education, higher status jobs, and they hire people to work for them, they have the same amount 
of spare time as those with least skilled jobs, suggesting further that time availability varies due 
to life circumstances rather than wealth. People of upper strata are more likely to participate in 
both conventional and unconventional activities. Even in systems with equal opportunities, more 
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affluent citizens are more highly educated, and they have the advantage of well-educated and 
affluent parents who pass on civic culture to them (Scholzman, 2012; Nalecz, 1997).  
Findings regarding education as a determinant of political participation are controversial. 
McVeigh and Smith (1999) claim that education makes individuals skeptical of the political 
process; therefore, they prefer to participate in social protest rather than donate time or money. 
Individuals who declared that they had educated themselves politically, according to McVeigh 
and Smith, were more likely to engage politically in both institutional politics and protest, 
relative to no action. Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) findings suggest that voters were well 
educated and non-poor. The authors further claim that there is a correlation between education 
and voting, because the educated have a sense of civic duty, a better understanding of politics 
and are capable of handling bureaucratic challenges when registering to vote. A ceiling effect is 
also evident among studies when it comes to the SES model, suggesting that primary and 
secondary educations are important, as they equip people with cognitive skills. However, at the 
country level growth in the proportion of the population going to college and further increase in 
wealth does raise turnout (Norris, 2002). 
 
Political information 
One way SES can shape participation is due to the ease of acquiring political information. 
Political information is an important factor that shapes political participation. Cognitive 
participation, which refers to political participation through obtaining information while 
watching TV, listening to news on the radio, reading magazines, talking to friends and similar 
activities, is another form of participation that is advantageous to the rich. Individuals with 
higher educational levels have higher political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). The 
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rich have more access to intellectual media, have more time to take part in such activities, and 
they are surrounded by the upper-class, who is also more informed (Beeghley, 1986). Ideological 
conceptualization is also correlated with higher social status. In most of the European countries 
the weight of education and motivation in predicting ideological conceptualization is about the 
same; whereas in the United States, education plays a greater role (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). 
Although ideological conceptualization is an important factor for predicting participation in 
conventional political activities, the same cannot be said about participation in unconventional 
political activities (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Individuals who declared that they had educated 
themselves politically, are more likely to engage in institutional politics and protest (McVeigh 
and Smith, 1999). 
The SES model suggests that disadvantaged people have little voice in pluralist 
democracy; their income predicts their education, political knowledge, competence, skills, and 
resources, thus affecting their political engagement. Electoral processes in most countries (e.g., 
registration requirements and voting procedures) have also shown less favorability towards the 
poor. Additionally, contemporary voting procedures require greater knowledge and reading 
skills, which ultimately affects the poor (Beeghley, 1986). Nevertheless, the studies that deal 
with SES mostly measure political participation by accounting only for conventional political 
activities. Barnes and Kasse (1979) suggest that protesters, whose portfolio is limited to direct 
political action, have lower levels of education. So people from lower strata are politically active 
and their participation is through unconventional channels. Protest activities are not predicted by 
income in Brazil (Brooks, 2014). 
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Rational choice theory 
Rational choice theory states that individuals participate in political activities because 
they expect benefits from their participation. Hence, their participation is calculated by 
measuring the cost associated with the action taken. Ultimately, the benefit has to outweigh the 
cost (Gabriel et al., 2012).  
Olson’s (1965) famous work asserts that when considering whether to take part in 
collective action, many individuals believe that their participation would have little effect on the 
success of the action; however, if the change for which that action is taken occurs, then those 
who haven’t participated can’t be denied the benefit. Hence the free-rider problem arises. The 
rational individual will not participate and will benefit from the participation of others (Olson, 
1965). Olson suggests that selective incentives will solve the free-rider problem. In protest 
participation, selective incentives sometimes may be as simple as social acceptance, or they can 
be material and psychological. 
Finkel and Muller (1998) test rational choice theory as an explanation of protest behavior. 
Their model predicts future protest participation based on one’s dissatisfaction with the public 
provision of goods, perception of success, and perceived importance of personal participation. 
However, when they add selective incentives to the model, they assert that those incentives add 
very little to the explanatory power.  
 
Clientelism  
Clientelism provides selective incentives, and is an essential factor when talking about 
political participation in Kosovo. Clientelism refers to the trade between parties and voter, where 
parties offer material benefits in exchange for the recipient’s vote (Stokes et al., 2013).  
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Risk attitudes  
Another important variable that explains political behavior is risk attitudes. Risk 
accepting individuals seek novelty and excitement; therefore, they are more likely to engage in 
political activities (Kam, 2012). As insecurity reduces risk acceptance, citizens who are less 
secure withdraw from political participation (Brooks, 2014). Risk attitudes relate to rational 
choice theory, because people’s perceptions of benefits and costs are affected by their attitudes 
towards risk. 
 
Grievance theories 
Prominent among grievance-based theories, the theory of relative deprivation proposes 
that citizens protest when their expectations are not met and their grievance level and deprivation 
increases (Gurr 1970; Turner and Killian 1972; Berkowitz 1972). This leads citizens to respond 
to collective mobilization and can lead to violence (Jessop, 1971). A sudden grievance increases 
political participation and it operates at a collective level. For instance, people are inclined to 
protest about unemployment, regardless of their employment status (Kern et al., 2015). 
Klandermans and Stekelenburg (2013) suggest that when the personal becomes political (that is, 
when one bases one’s personal experience on a group experience) one is more inclined to protest. 
Relative deprivation, which refers to tension that develops when there’s a discrepancy 
between one’s expectations and value capabilities (Gurr, 1970), increases one’s potential to 
participate in collective action. As described by Gurr (1970), value capabilities are goods that 
people believe they have a right to or are entitled to. The greater the discrepancy the greater the 
discontent.  
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Policy implications that create discontent among citizens also mobilize people to 
participate in collective action (Finkel et al, 1989). Besides these, certain events impose a feeling 
of obligation on people that they have to do something to promote change (Opp and Gern, 1993). 
Political changes may increase positive incentives to participate in unconventional political 
activities (Opp and Gern, 1993).  
Relative deprivation, political alienation, and political dissatisfaction are principal 
psychological determinant that explain participation in unconventional political activities 
(Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Finkel et al., 1989; Gurr, 1970).  
The emergence of social movements and other organizations has had an impact, as well, 
and has led to a reshaping of political engagement. Collective actions through peaceful channels 
have become generally a way to express political grievance (Norris, 2002). A lengthy process of 
mobilization sometimes leads people to protest (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). Political 
parties and social movements sometimes play the role of the catalyst to mobilize people for 
protest participation and they minimize the role resources play in political participation. 
Movements affect protest participation by disseminating information and mobilizing citizens 
(Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). 
Groups with rising expectation have higher protest potential than groups whose 
expectations are stable. Therefore, education does not play as a great role among the less affluent 
if they have high grievance and deprivation levels. Protest activities are not influenced by a 
dislike of the office holder per se, but rather by the motive to challenge issue agendas and policy 
dissatisfaction (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Dalton et al. (2010), analyzing World Bank data, state 
that national economic and political conditions affect protest participation and that protests are 
more likely to occur in developed democracies. Booth and Seligson (2009) propose an opposing 
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theory that states that political alienation produces higher participation rates, and citizens of 
countries with low levels of legitimacy participate actively in communal activism, civil society, 
and protest.  Demographics are important in protest participation. Demographics interact with the 
preexisting social conditions, such as unemployment and declining or stagnated economic 
development, and aggravate them by causing conflict (LaGraffe, 2012). Literature on youth 
bulges
2
 suggests that when the labor market can’t secure jobs for the flood of youth who are 
seeking jobs, this large population of young people with unmet expectations is more likely to 
cause political violence (LaGraffe, 2012; Nordas and Davenport, 2013). 
As different findings in different countries propose different theories, it is evident that 
there isn’t one single variable that predicts political behavior in any given country. In addition, 
determinants of protest vary from country to country. There is interconnectivity between 
different variables. Conventional and unconventional modes of political participation are both 
related to many determinants besides social status and education, and the two modes are 
complementary to each other (Barnes and Kaase, 1979).  
There is little to no data concerning political participation in Kosovo, so these relevant 
theories are used as a starting point for this study. 
 
Theory 
There are several factors that lead people to participate actively in conventional or 
unconventional political activities. I theorize that political participation in Kosovo has a different 
pattern compared to other countries. As a country in transition, the above-mentioned factors have 
                                                 
2
 Youth bulges refer to the increasing size of population with large cohorts of youth due to high birth rates over time 
(LaGraffe, 2012).  
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different effects in shaping political behavior, in comparison to the countries that have well-
nourished democracies (e.g., with free elections, fewer or no human rights violations, free media, 
etc.). In Kosovo, I argue, socio-economic status does not play as much of a role as it does other 
countries. Instead, socio-economic status has an opposite effect. In Kosovo, people who have 
lower incomes are more likely to participate in both conventional and unconventional activities, 
as a consequence of rising grievances. The underdeveloped economy and stagnated democracy 
have led to increasing grievance of Kosovo citizens. As the unemployment rate is increasing, it is 
leading to the frustration of the youth (Feltes, 2013). 
I predict that people with lower incomes are more likely to participate in unconventional 
political activities, since their unmet expectations include daily needs and are more immediate. 
Moreover, I predict that they use unconventional activities as complementary actions to 
conventional activities; because the poor have basic human needs, and they see the election 
processes as taking too long (i.e., every four years), thus they use unconventional activities to 
apply pressure to politicians and to have their demands met. Although studies suggest that the 
more educated the citizens are, the more critical they are of the government, I argue that the less 
affluent in Kosovo have very high grievances, and are as critical of governmental performance as 
the educated. 
As the high unemployment rate in Kosovo has led to frustration among youth, my theory 
suggests that the youth tend to have higher expectations and higher grievance levels; therefore, 
the youth in Kosovo are more likely to participate in political activities. Considering that Kosovo 
has a very young population, youth bulges are present and they have increasing demands by 
entering a market that doesn’t offer jobs, which further increases their grievance. Economic 
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instability, I argue, causes a feeling of insecurity and increases political participation, rather than 
decreasing it. 
The latest available data indicates that 45% of the Kosovo population lives below the 
national poverty line. With a great percentage of the population living under the poverty line and 
yet being politically active, I predict that mobilization by political parties serve as an equalizer 
for participation of citizens who lack resources. Political parties disseminate information and 
provide some of the resources that are essential for people to participate politically. Besides 
information, these resources could be things such as transportation. Although education is 
usually highly correlated with political information, I expect to find that in Kosovo due to a 
highly politicized media, the population, in aggregate, is highly informed politically, including 
the uneducated or less educated. Political parties and other organizations also serve as agents to 
inform citizens politically. 
When it comes to ideological conceptualization, I argue that citizens in Kosovo lack 
ideological identification. This is also due to the fact that parties in Kosovo are mainly catch-all 
parties. Nevertheless, protest activities are issue oriented, and do not occur because of dislike of 
the government or dissatisfaction, per se. 
Kosovo citizens still have a collective memory around the years of the resistance during 
the Serbian regime and the war; therefore, I hypothesize that national identity and issues 
regarding the statehood of Kosovo still represent very sensitive issues for the citizens of Kosovo. 
Due to the historical context of Kosovo, nationalistic sentiments are still very likely to mobilize 
people for protest participation. If the issues arising are related to the national identity, I argue 
they tend to increase protest potential in Kosovo, especially national issues concerning the war 
and after-war period. 
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  Political parties in Kosovo are salient in mobilizing people to be engaged politically and 
help people overcome their lack of resources. As parties in Kosovo are catch-all, I assume that 
they target people from all socio-economic strata, but they especially aim to attract people from 
the lower strata, because people from the lower strata constitute the highest percentage of 
citizens in Kosovo. Party membership in Kosovo is high. Therefore, my theory further suggests 
that partisanship is strong among the poor, and the parties mobilize them, the political 
engagement of the poor is high in Kosovo. Clientelism serves as a selective incentive to vote; 
where the poor are given material goods in exchange for their votes. Party loyalty is rewarded 
with a job or governmental position. 
In summary, I expect there are several factors that shape political participation in 
Kosovo. These factors are not mutually exclusive but intertwined with each other. I argue that 
historical context has had great influence in affecting political behavior in Kosovo. Other factors 
that are invaluable in shaping political engagement in Kosovo are the high grievance level and 
governmental dissatisfaction. Moreover, the political system and political parties’ proactive 
approach in mobilizing people are evident factors that explain political engagement in both 
conventional and unconventional political activities. 
 
Hypotheses 
H1: The poor in Kosovo (i.e., those with incomes less than 250 Euros per month) are more 
inclined to participate in both conventional and unconventional political activities, compared to 
individuals with higher incomes. 
 
H2:  Youth in Kosovo are more inclined to protest compared to older citizens. 
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H3: Individuals with lower government satisfaction are more inclined to participate in 
unconventional political activities, compared to individuals who have neutral feeling towards 
government or higher government satisfaction. 
 
H4: Education doesn’t have a significant, positive correlation with political information; 
therefore, the uneducated, on average, are as politically informed as the educated. 
 
H5: Mobilization influences citizens in Kosovo to participate actively. 
 
H6: Individuals in Kosovo are more inclined to protest about social and economic issues, such 
as education, healthcare, and the high unemployment rate, rather than the political situation. 
 
H7: Nationalism serves as a strong mobilizer of political protests in Kosovo.
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
In order to answer my research questions regarding political participation in Kosovo, I 
use mixed methods: both quantitative and qualitative. I analyze data from two surveys: a survey I 
deployed to a small sample of respondents in Kosovo, and data from a survey conducted by 
UNDP Kosovo in the October, 2015 Public Pulse poll. In addition, I conducted four qualitative 
interviews based on a purposive sample
3
, as means to complement the quantitative data.  
 
Quantitative Data 
Surveys in Kosovo  
Before acquiring data from UNDP Kosovo, I started collecting surveys in Kosovo. Due 
to the budgetary limitations, this survey represented a small sample of 350 respondents. The data 
are used in this research to complement the UNDP data and to analyze questions that are 
unavailable in the UNDP Kosovo Public Pulse survey. 
  
Sampling 
The surveys were conducted in the Prishtina District, which is the capital city of Kosovo. 
According to the Statistical Agency of Kosovo (SAK), 198,897 people live in the Prishtina 
                                                 
3 The IRB Approval for this Research can be found in Appendix E 
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district; 81.32% in urban areas and 18.67% in rural areas. With a 5% margin error and 95% level 
of confidence, a population of 198,897 required a sample size of 384
4
. 
Following the practice of the SAK, I divided Prishtina into the city of Prishtina and 41 
surrounding villages. As divided by the Municipality of Prishtina, the city of Prishtina was 
further separated into the following 4 divisions: Kryqezimi I Taukbahces (East); Dardania 
(West); Xhamia e Llapit (North); and Upliana (South). 
From the 41 villages that are under administration of the Municipality of Prishtina, the 
following five villages were picked randomly using an internet based random number generator: 
Ballaban, Grashtice, Kolovice, Makoc, and Matican. 
The surveys were conducted during a period between November, 2015 and January, 
2016, based on the divisions mentioned above. The starting house was chosen by using the 
starting point method in urban areas, where after numbering the blocks, one was selected at 
random. The corners of the chosen blocks were assigned letters, one of which was also selected 
at random. Moving in a clockwise direction from that corner, all houses up to the next corner 
were numbered and one of these were also be chosen randomly and that was the first household 
to be interviewed. From there onward, every fifth household was included in the sample 
(UNICEF, 2008). If one house did not respond, the survey was distributed to the next fifth house. 
Based on the percentage of people living in urban areas and in rural areas, 312 questionnaires 
were distributed in the urban areas as follows: East (which covers 168 streets); West (which 
covers 50 streets); North (which covers 130 streets); and South (which covers 77 streets). The 
                                                 
4
 The sample size was chosen by using the online survey software, Raosoft, which uses the formula as follows: x = 
Z(
c
/100)
2
r(100-r)  ; n = 
N x
/((N-1)E
2
 + x) ; E= Sqrt[
(N
 
-
 
n)x
/n(N-1)], where N is the population size, r is the fraction of responses 
that you are interested in, and Z(c/100) is the critical value for the confidence level c.  
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number of the questionnaires that were distributed in each division depended on the number of 
the streets that the division covers, and 72 questionnaires were distributed in 5 villages 
mentioned above. The survey number in each village was determined by the size of the village.  
The starting point in the village was chosen by going to some central location within the 
community such as a market, a church, or a health facility. The direction then was chosen at 
random by spinning a bottle, and moving in a straight line in that direction. All the houses that 
were passed were counted until the edge of the community was reached. All houses were 
numbered and then one of these numbered houses was selected at random to form the starting 
point for the survey (UNICEF, 2008). 
An informed consent notice was attached to the questionnaire. The participants were 
asked to read the informed consent information first and then proceed with the self-completed 
questionnaire. For those who had trouble reading, the informed consent was presented orally and 
the questions were read aloud and explained. The questionnaires requested no personal 
information; therefore, there it is impossible to track down the respondents by any means. 
These survey questions examined gender, age, socio-economic status (e.g., occupation, 
income, education), and political information. Moreover, as stated above, questions focused on 
participation in both conventional and unconventional political activities.  
 
 
UNDP Public Pulse Data  
The UNDP Public Pulse data come from an opinion poll conducted in Kosovo during 
September, 2015. They use multistage random probability sampling and their sample consists of 
1,306 respondents of age 18 and older, from both sexes, covering both rural and urban areas 
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(UNDP Kosovo, 2015). The sample includes 896 Kosovo Albanians, 210 Kosovo Serbians, and 
200 Kosovo non-Serbian minorities (namely Turkish, Bosnian, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, and 
Egyptian). Minorities are oversampled, because the UNDP Public Pulse disaggregates data by 
ethnicity (UNDP Kosovo, 2015).  
The UNDP data present some limitations, however. Their measure of protest 
participation doesn’t directly measure participation, rather the “protest potential”; as they ask the 
respondents if they would participate and not if they have participated.
5
  Moreover, since the 
UNDP data oversampled minorities, weights were used. The UNDP data was received with 
calculated weights, which then were included in each analysis.  
 
Qualitative Data 
Interviews 
The interview sample represents nonprobability (i.e., purposive) sampling, and represents 
the group that is already politically active or involved in politics, directly or indirectly, and it 
does not represent the whole population of Kosovo. 
Four individuals that represent the above-mentioned group were interviewed.  
 Dardan Molliqaj is the secretary of the Self-Determination Movement. The Self-
Determination movement is center-left and identified as an anti-system 
movement. It has organized the majority of the protests in Kosovo since after the 
war. The Self-Determination Movement is the biggest opposition party in the 
Parliament of Kosovo. 
                                                 
5
 This is further explained in the results chapter.  
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 Atdhe Hetemi is a UNDP project manager in Kosovo. He is in charge of Public 
Pulse, which is a biannual poll conducted since 2007 that measures public opinion 
and political satisfaction in Kosovo. 
 Petrit Zogaj is the Director of the Fol Movement. The Fol Movement is among 
the most credible non-governmental organizations in Kosovo. They were founded 
on 2008 and they conduct credible research. 
 Ramadan Ilazi is a well-known political activist. He cofounded the Fol 
Movement. He joined the Democratic Party of Kosovo during the 2014 elections. 
Ramadan was appointed as the Vice Minister of European Integration after the 
PDK won the elections. Ramadan was interviewed because both the civil society 
and government perspectives.  
 
Specific questions from the surveys were asked of the interviewees. However, analysis of 
the interviews identified a similar set of variables as the factors identified in analysis of the 
quantitative survey data.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
To explore conventional and unconventional political participation in Kosovo, I begin by 
introducing some frequencies for independent variables measuring political participation in 
Kosovo. Then I run logistic regression analysis to answer my main research question and test my 
hypotheses.  
 
Measures of conventional and unconventional political participation in the UNDP 
Data 
Unfortunately, the UNDP 2015 data does not fully measure unconventional or 
conventional political participation. However there are two sets of variables that partially 
measure these two concepts. UNDP data measures protest participation by asking respondents 
whether they would take part in mass public protest regarding education, policy issues, low 
wage, unemployment, and public utilities. As this question doesn’t directly ask citizens whether 
they have participated, but rather if they would participate in the future, an index of protest 
potential, rather than protest activity itself, was created as a score of these indicator variables 
(dummy variables) for the five types of protest. The UNDP Data also has another measure asking 
citizens whether they supported a contentious political activity (e.g., petition, protest) of a civil 
society organization. However, this question only measures participation in unconventional 
political activities that are organized by nongovernment organizations. Twenty percent of 
citizens answered that they supported a contentious political activity of a civil organization.  
29 
 
 
Measures of conventional and unconventional political participation in the ISU study in 
Kosovo 
To measure conventional political participation of citizens of Kosovo using the ISU 
study, a scale was created by adding indicator (i.e., dummy) variables for the following five 
activities: 1) getting informed through newspapers, 2) discussing political issues, 3) persuading 
others to support a candidate, 4) participating in party meetings, and 5) helping a candidate or 
political party. Missing answers were ignored in the analysis. Another measure of conventional 
political participation in this data was voting in the national elections.  
 Unconventional political participation is measured using a question asking about 
participation in protest. Respondents chose whether they (1) had protested, (2) had not protested 
but would, (3) were undecided, (4) “might,” or (5) would never protest. To simplify analysis, I 
focus on those who chose the first or fifth categories, and collapse the second, third, and fourth 
categories into a single category.  
 
Grievances 
 In order to get a better sense of the level of grievances in Kosovo, measures from both the 
ISU study and UNDP data were used.  
Table 1. Satisfaction with the current political direction in Kosovo 
 
Freq. Percent 
   Very Satisfied 16 1.27 
Satisfied 88 6.98 
Neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied 330 26.19 
Dissatisfied 432 34.29 
Very dissatisfied 394 31.27 
   Total 1,260 100 
   Source: UNDP Data, 2015 
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The UNDP Data shows that citizens’ dissatisfaction with the current political direction in 
Kosovo is very high; 66% of citizens said that they are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied.  
Also, a large number of respondents (over 75%) said that they are dissatisfied with the economic 
direction in Kosovo at present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Responsibility on the current political situation in Kosovo (UNDP 2015) 
 
Figure 1 shows that as many as 65% of Kosovo citizens believe that the Kosovo 
government is responsible for the current political situation. When asked if they would join 
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public protests that might be organized due to the current political situation, a relatively large 
number of respondents (44%) said that they would. Fifty percent of citizens believe that their 
vote cannot change the situation in Kosovo. Acknowledging that recently Kosovo has had a great 
flux of emigration, eighteen percent of citizens said that they had plan to emigrate from Kosovo, 
43% of whom said that unfavorable economic situations in the family would be the reason for 
their emigration; 38% said that they would emigrate to seek a better future for their family and 
6% said because of their dissatisfaction with the current political situation in Kosovo.  
Among the citizens who said that they would emigrate because of the unfavorable 
economic situations in their family, 82% think that the Government of Kosovo is responsible for 
the current economic situation in Kosovo. 
In the ISU study in Kosovo as many as 36% of respondents said that they have 
participated in protest activities and 39% have participated in signing a petition. When it comes 
to conventional political participation, 72% of citizens in the ISU study stated that they have 
voted in the national elections and 69% of the citizens who voted said that they did so because 
it’s their civic duty, while 13% said that they didn’t like the previous prime minister and they did 
not want him to be re-elected. One of the interviewees also suggested that “citizens of Kosovo 
rather than considering voting as a right, they consider it an obligation. This is highly associated 
with the fact that citizens of Kosovo were oppressed for a long time and did not have this 
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Figure 2. Responsibility for the current economic situation, among those who said would 
emigrate because of the unfavorable economic situation (UNDP 2015) 
 
fundamental right. Now they see it as something that shouldn’t be taken for granted.” Interviews 
with the key stakeholders also suggest that besides seeing it as an obligation, citizens of Kosovo 
participate in voting to keep a particular party in power, because they benefit directly from them.  
 Table 2 shows that from a scale of zero to five, the mean of conventional political 
participation in Kosovo is 2.49. 
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Table 2. Mean of the conventional political participation index 
Mean Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 
    2.49 0.04 2.41-2.57 
    Source: ISU study in Kosovo 
  
 
Table 3. Participation in conventional political activities 
 
Read about 
politics in 
newspaper 
Discuss 
politics 
with other 
people 
Try to 
convince 
friends to 
vote as 
same as 
you 
Attend 
political 
meetings 
or rallies 
Spend time 
working for 
a political 
party or a 
candidate 
Very Often 28.69 18.28 3.24 2.41 2.15 
Often 27.61 31.72 6.22 7.24 5.11 
Sometimes 25.2 26.61 18.65 13.14 10.22 
Rarely 10.19 18.55 23.24 23.59 23.12 
Never 8.31 4.84 48.65 53.62 59.41 
      Total 100 100 100 100 100 
      Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
 
When looking at the percentages of participation in each conventional political activity as 
shown in table 3, it is evident that reading about politics in newspapers is high, where 56% of the 
citizens said that they engage in this activity very often or often, and 25% said that they read 
about politics in newspapers sometimes. While discussing politics with other people is among 
activities with high participation, other activities are relatively low: trying to convince friends to 
vote the same, attending political meetings or rallies, and spending time working for a political 
party or a candidate.  
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H1: The poor in Kosovo (that is those with incomes less than 300 euros) are more inclined to 
participate in both conventional and unconventional political activities, compared to individuals 
with higher incomes.  
 
 
Table 4. Unconventional political participation: protest by income 
 
 
Protest participation 
 
Income Have done Would never do 
150-300 euro 35.4 13.27 
300-500 euro 38.02 11.57 
500-700 euro 37.50 15.62 
750- more than 1000 euro 38.89 22.22 
   
 
36.97 13.38 
 
Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
 
Table 4 shows protest activity is the highest among people who earn 750-1000 euro, and 
not people who earn 150-300 euros per month.  
 
Table 5. Voting in national elections by income 
 
 
Voting in national 
elections 
 Income Yes No Total 
150-300 euro 64.22 35.78 100 
300-500 euro 89.92 10.08 100 
500-700 euro 90.62 9.38 100 
750- more than 1000 euro 61.11 38.89 100 
        
Total 78.06 21.94 100 
    Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
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When looking at conventional political participation, voting is relatively high among all 
income categories; however, voting is the highest among the middle income: those who earn 
300-500 euros per months and those who earn 500-700 euros per month.  
The other component of SES, education doesn’t explain protest participation. The 
correlation between education and protest participation is 0.04 (p=0.40). However, education 
explains voting participation. The correlation between voting and education is 0.29 (p=0.00). 
 
H2: Youth in Kosovo are more likely to protest and vote compared to older citizens  
 
 
The results in table 6 show that voting activity is very high among all age groups and it’s 
heterogeneous; however the higher the age group the higher the participation in voting, with little 
difference between the age groups 36-50 and 51-81.  
 
 
Table 6. Voting in national elections by age 
 
 
 
Voting in national elections 
    Yes No Total 
 Age       
 18-25 57.53 42.47 100 
 26-35 78.89 21.11 100 
 36-50 90.54 9.46 100 
 51-81 88.68 11.32 100 
 
     Total 74.1 25.9 100 
   
Source: ISU study in Kosovo 
 
 
When it comes to protest participation potential (measured by using UNDP Data), table 7 
shows that citizens aged 18-35 have the highest protest potential.  However, when looking at 
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actual participation in protest activity, citizens aged 18-25 and aged 51-84 have the highest 
protest participation.  Correlation between voting and age is 0.29 (p=0.00).
6
 However, the 
logistic model shows that age is significant when it comes to voting.
7
  
Table 7. The mean of protest potential index by age 
 
  Variable Mean 
Protest 
potential index 
if age 18-25 0.56 
Protest 
potential index 
if age 26-35 0.57 
Protest 
potential index 
if age 36-50 0.49 
Protest 
potential index 
if age 51-84 0.38 
  Source: UNDP Data 2015 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Participation in unconventional activities: protest by 
age 
  
 
Protesting 
Age Have done Would Never do 
18-25 41.3 11.59 
26-35 31.46 13.48 
26-50 36.62 11.27 
51-84 43.4 20.75 
   
Total 38.18 13.39 
                                                 
6 Find it in Appendix C 
7
 Ibid 
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Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
 
 
H3: Individuals with lower government satisfaction are more inclined to participate in 
unconventional political activities, compared to individuals who have a neutral feeling towards 
government or higher government satisfaction.  
To measure dissatisfaction the satisfaction with the government work on policy issues 
variable was reverse coded. This variable has five measures as follow: satisfaction with the 
government work fighting poverty, providing a good education, providing equal rights for ethnic 
minorities, looking after elderly, and creating job opportunities for everyone. These five 
measures then were divided by five, and dissatisfaction with the government index was created. 
The correlation between dissatisfaction and a dummy variable for protest is -.07 (p=.16). 
This can also be seen in Table 9 (below), where the mean of government dissatisfaction with 
those who have protested and those who haven’t is about the same.  
Table 9. Dissatisfaction with government, by protest 
participation 
  Protest Mean 
Didn’t protest 3.68 
Protested 3.81 
  Total 3.73 
  Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
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H4: Education doesn’t have a significant, positive correlation with political information; 
therefore, the uneducated, on average, are as politically informed as the educated. 
To measure political information, a scale of political information was formed based on 
answers to questions 28-32 in the ISU study in Kosovo: 
 
1. Please write how long is the term for Prime Minister and MPs. 
2. Please write the unemployment rate in Kosovo. 
3. Which are the four biggest political parties in Kosovo? 
4. Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not? 
5. Which party has the most seats in the Parliament? 
 
 Missing and wrong answers were coded as zero, while right answers were coded as 1. 
On a scale of 0-1, citizens’ mean level of political information in Kosovo is 0.75. 
The literature asserts that resource mobilization is highly important for political 
participation, hence SES is critically important and affects whether people possess political 
information, time, and other relevant resources. The results show that people in Kosovo 
generally have high political information.  
 
Table 10. Mean level of political information in Kosovo 
 
Mean Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 
    0.75 0.02 0.72-0.77 
    Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
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 Further, to test this hypothesis I assessed the correlation between income and 
information.  The correlation between these two variables is 0.034, which shows that there’s no 
correlation between information and income. Table 11 shows the mean information index is 
almost the same within each income category, with the exception of the group with incomes 750-
1000 euros per months, where the information index is somewhat lower. 
 
 
 
Table 11. Information index by each income category 
     
  Mean 
Standard 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
150-300 euros per month 0.75 0.02 0.71 - 0.79 
300- 500 euros per month 0.76 0.02 0.73 - 0.80 
500-750 euros per month 0.78 0.04 0.69 - 0.86 
750 – more than1000 euros per month 0.68 0.09 0.47 - 0.87 
     Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
 
 
The important results when it comes to political information and income, is that income 
does not determine political information in Kosovo. However, the same cannot be said about 
education.  Although Table 12 shows the correlation between education and political information 
is low, when looking at the mean of the political information index within each education 
category, one can tell that as education increases, so does political information (see Table 13). 
All of the stakeholders who were interviewed asserted that Kosovo citizens are informed about 
political issues in Kosovo, but most of the time the information that they receive is biased. One 
of the interviewees suggested the citizens only read the headlines of the news and don’t read the 
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content of the news. Two other interviewees suggested “citizens in Kosovo are informed about 
the political situation in Kosovo but most of the time this information is either one-sided or 
biased.”  Correlation between education and information index is 0.06 (p=0.35).  
 
Table 12. Information index by each education category 
     
 
Mean 
Information 
Index 
Standard 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
No schooling completed 
0.43 0.13 0.10 - 0.76 
Primary school or less  
0.63 0.06 0.51 - 0.75 
Some high school but no diploma 
0.59 0.06 0.47 - 0.70 
High school, with diploma 
0.70 0.03 0.64 - 0.77 
Some courses in college/vocational training 
0.71 0.03 0.65 - 0.76 
Bachelor's degree 0.78 0.02 0.73 - 0.82 
Master's degree or PhD 
0.79 0.02 0.73 - 0.85 
     Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
 
H5: Mobilization influences citizens in Kosovo to participate actively. 
Considering that political parties are the main organizers of protests in Kosovo, party 
membership has been used as a measure of mobilization for protest activities. The same measure 
will also be used for voting, as clientelism is high in Kosovo and because it is very common for 
political parties to mobilize their supporters during the electoral campaign. Party membership 
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was measures by using the following survey question: Are you affiliated with any political party 
or political organization? Yes was coded as 1 and No was coded as zero. 
 
Table 13. Protest participation, by party membership 
    Protest participation  
Party membership  Haven’t Protested Protested Total 
Yes 52.56 47.44 100 
No 61.69 38.31 100 
        
Total 59.51 40.49 100 
    Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
 
Table 14 shows that 47% of the citizens who are party members protested, and only 38% of 
citizens who are not party members protested.  Still, 53% of party members and 62% of non-
party members have not protested. These results indicate that there is a 9% gap between party 
members and non-party members in protest - party membership raises protest participation by 
9%, thus it can be concluded that political parties are important in mobilizing people to 
participate in protest activities.  
 “Discussing political issues with others” was used as another measure of social network 
mobilization. The correlation between the dummy variables for “protested” and for “discussed 
politics” is 0.22 (p=0.00).  
 
H6: Individuals in Kosovo are more inclined to protest about social issues and economic issues, 
such as education, healthcare, and the high unemployment rate, than the political situation. 
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 To measure social issues and economic issues, means of three variables have been used 
from the ISU study in Kosovo. First variable is the belief that the economy and unemployment 
are under threat; second, the belief that political situation is under threat and the third variable is 
the satisfaction with the current education policies.  
 As stated previously, Kosovo has undergone a lot of political/institutional issues in the 
past decade. Just after the recent national elections, Kosovo’s institutions were blocked (unable 
to hold sessions) for a period of six months. One of the interviewees said, “This political 
blockage that lasted for 6 months paralyzed the intuitional work that affected the economic 
activity. People saw this as political war between parties who only cared for their party interests, 
and not the well-being of the citizens.” However, it’s hypothesized that people don’t protest over 
such issues, but rather over issues that seek more tangible results: better education, better health 
services etc. 
 Table 15 shows the mean of those who think that the economy and unemployment pose a 
national threat to Kosovo (on a scale from 1 to 10) is pretty high among both groups that have 
protested and those who said that would never protest. The mean is somewhat higher among 
those who have protested.  
 
Table 14. Mean belief that the economy and unemployment are under threat, 
by protest participation 
  Protest Mean 
    
Didn’t protest 8.59 
Protested 8.70 
    
Total 8.63 
  Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
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Table 15. Mean belief that the political 
situation is under threat, by protest 
participation 
 
 
Protest Mean 
    
Didn’t protest 7.75 
Protested 8.04 
    
Total 7.86 
  Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
 
 
 
Table 16. Mean satisfaction with current education policies (1-5 scale), 
by protest participation 
  Protested Mean 
    
Didn’t protest 2.39 
Protested 2.34 
    
Total 2.37 
  Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
 
 
 
The mean perception that the political situation is a national threat is 0.62 higher among those 
who have protested compared to those who haven’t (See Table 16.) Whereas the satisfaction (on 
a 1-5 scale) with the government is low in both groups, but it is somewhat lower among those 
have protested compared to those who haven’t by .052 (see Table 17.) 
The index of political protest in the UNDP data shows that both satisfaction with the 
political direction in Kosovo and satisfaction with the economic direction in Kosovo have 
negative correlations with the protest potential index. The correlation between protest potential 
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and satisfaction with the political direction in Kosovo is -.221 (p=0.00). The correlation between 
protest potential and satisfaction with the economic direction in Kosovo is heading towards and 
protest potential index is -.0204 (p=0.00). The results show that the lower satisfaction, the higher 
the protest potential index.  
 
H7: Nationalism is a strong mobilizer of political protests in Kosovo. 
Considering the history of Kosovo and understanding that post-war issues are still fresh, 
it is hypothesized that nationalism plays a great role in mobilizing people to participate in protest 
activities in Kosovo. To measure nationalism, respondents were asked to rate from scale 1-10 the 
extent to which they believe that Serbia poses national threat to Kosovo. Table 18 shows that 
perception Serbia is a national threat is 0.15 higher among those who have protested than those 
who haven’t protested. Correlation between dummy variable of protesting and the measure of 
nationalism this correlation is 0.03 (p=0.63).  
 
Table 17. Mean belief that Serbia is national threat, by protest participation 
  Protest  Mean 
    
Didn’t protest 7.03 
Protested 7.19 
    
Total 7.09 
  Source: ISU Data in Kosovo 
  
To validate these findings, I used a second question from the UNDP data to measure 
nationalism: “To the extent that you know, against what individuals will the Special Court issue 
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indictments?” Table 19 shows that protest potential is higher among those who think that this 
Court will decide against Kosovo Albanians, including current politicians who committed 
crimes. 
  
Table 18. Mean of Protest Potential Index by opinions on indictments against what 
individuals will Special Court decide 
  Opinions on indictments against what individuals will 
Supreme Court decide  Mean 
    
Against Kosovo Serbs, including politicians who 
committed crime 0.49 
Against Kosovo Albanians, including current 
politicians who committed crimes 0.57 
Against those who committed crimes in the war in 
1990 regardless of their ethnicity 0.49 
  Source: UNDP Data 2015 
 
 
Logistic Regressions 
To conduct logistic regression, a dummy variable for protest was used as a measure of 
unconventional political participation. A dummy variable for voting was used as a measure of 
conventional political participation. The following independent variables were tested in the 
model: age, income, education, satisfaction with the government, information index, party 
membership, nationalism, and discussing politics with others.   
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Table 19. Model 1 - Logistic regression model of protest 
       
Protest Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] 
       Income -0.06 0.16 -0.38 0.71 -0.38 0.26 
Education 0.45 0.08 0.56 0.57 -0.09 0.23 
Age 0.04 0.13 0.33 0.74 -0.21 0.29 
Satisfaction with 
government -0.02 0.18 -0.10 0.92 -0.36 0.33 
Information Index -0.77 0.66 -1.15 0.25 -2.07 0.54 
Party Membership 0.16 0.32 0.49 0.67 -0.48 0.79 
Nationalism -0.01 0.01 -0.47 0.64 -0.03 0.02 
Discussing Politics 0.48 0.14 3.37 0.00 0.20 0.76 
       Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
 
This model has only 237 observations. Table 19 shows that the only variable that is 
significant in explaining protest participation is discussing politics with others. Party 
membership is a variable that significantly explains voting (see Table 21), but not protest 
participation according to the model on table 20; thus another model was created to test the 
relationship between party membership and protest participation (See Table 20).  
 
Table 20. Model 2- Logistic regression model of protest 
       
Protest Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] 
       Discussed Politics with 
others .45 .11 3.98 0.00 .23 .66 
Party Membership .24 .27 0.88 0.38 -0.29 .76 
       Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
 
Note: Number of observation n=326 ; *p < .01.  
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When looking at the pairwise correlation coefficients, more variables explain protest 
participation. Statistical significance may be lacking in the regression model due to low numbers 
of observation. 
Table 21. Logistic regression model of voting 
       
Voting Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] 
       Income 0.05 0.22 0.20 0.84 -0.39 0.47 
Education 0.44 0.11 4.03 0.00 .23 .65 
Age 0.73 0.19 3.68 0.00 .34 1.11 
Satisfaction with 
Government 0.11 0.25 0.43 0.67 -0.38 0.59 
Information Index .53 0.86 062 0.54 -1.16 2.23 
Party Membership 1.69 0.66 2.57 0.01 0.41 2.97 
Nationalism -0.00 0.01 -0.23 0.82 -0.02 0.18 
Discussing politics 0.21 0.18 1.14 0.26 -0.15 0.57 
       Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
 
Note: Number of observation n=232 ; *p < .01.  
 
Several variables explain voting: education, age, and party membership, all have 
statistically significant positive correlations with voting. Looking at the pairwise correlation 
between voting and other independent variables it’s observed that the following variables have 
significant statistical correlations: income .13 (p=0.03); education 0.029 (p=0.00); age 0.299 
(p=0.00) information index .17 (p=0.00); and party membership 0.19 (p=0.00).  
A model using the UNDP data, in which unconventional participation is measured with 
the protest potential index, shows that satisfaction with the country’s economic direction 
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explains this index (See Table 22). However, when looking at the pairwise correlation log of 
income has a correlation of -.05 (p=0.09); education has a correlation of 0.09 (p=0.00); 
satisfaction with the country’s political direction -0.22 (p=0.00); and satisfaction with the 
country’s economic direction -0.02 (p=0.00). 
 
Table 22. Regression model of protest potential index 
       Protest Potential 
Index Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t P>t 
[95% Confidence 
Interval] 
  
     
  
Log Income -.01 .01 -1.63 0.10 -0.02 0.00 
Education 0.03 0.02 1.65 0.10 -0.01 0.06 
Satisfaction with 
Political 
Direction -0.00 0.00 -3.27 0.00 -0.00 -.00 
Satisfaction with 
economic 
direction -0.00 0.00 -0.77 0.44 -0.01 .00 
Special Court -.015 0.00 -3.43 0.00 .47 -.01 
       Source: ISU Study in Kosovo 
 
Note: Number of observation n=1,134 ; *p < .01.  
 
Since in both of the modes of political participation social networks were significant in 
explaining participation, further analyses were conducted to see what leads to social networks 
(discussing politics with others); therefore social networks were treated as depended variables.  
There is no significant correlation between social networks and age, or satisfaction with 
the government. However there’s a significant correlation between information and social 
networks of 0.17 (p=0.00) and income and social networks 0.16 (p=0.00). Also, the correlation 
between party membership and social networks is 0.13 (p=0.02). 
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The results from the ISU Study in Kosovo show that there are really two main variables 
that explain political participation in Kosovo: party membership and social networks. These two 
variables explain both modes of participation: conventional and unconventional. Party members 
have higher voting and protest participation rates when compared to the non-party members. 
Likewise, citizens who discuss politics with others have higher protest and voting rates, and this 
shows the importance of social networks. Social networks and parties serve as the main 
mobilizer for political participation. As other variables didn’t really explain political behavior in 
Kosovo, it can be assumed that parties and networks serve as catalyzers and reduce the need for 
resources in order to participate in political activities. 
In the results it was evident that political information was relatively high among all 
income groups, but there was some variation in political information by levels of education. 
Although citizens who have no education have mean political information index of .043, as the 
level of education increases so does the level of political information. It can be said that in 
general, people in Kosovo are informed about political issues regardless of their education. Both 
the ISU study in Kosovo and UNDP 2015 data show that the grievance level in Kosovo is very 
high. People are dissatisfied with the economic and political direction that Kosovo is heading 
towards. Although in the ISU study satisfaction with the government was not statistically 
significant in explaining political participation, the same is not the case in the UNDP data. 
Dissatisfaction with the political and economic direction in Kosovo are statistically significant in 
explaining the protest participation index in the UNDP data. However, the protest potential index 
measure the “will” to protest and not the activity itself; therefore, the UNDP data has limitation 
for drawing conclusions regarding the determinants of protest participation.  
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This research failed to falsify my hypothesis that mobilization influences citizens in 
Kosovo to participate actively. Moreover, this research failed to confirm the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H1: The poor in Kosovo (i.e., those with incomes less than 250 Euros per month) are more 
inclined to participate in both conventional and unconventional political activities, compared to 
individuals with higher incomes. 
 Participation in voting is more common among the middle class, while protest 
participation is the highest among the more affluent. 
 
H2:  Youth in Kosovo are more inclined to protest compared to older citizens. 
 The higher the age group the higher the participation in voting; whereas protest 
participation is the highest among the youth and the elder.  
 
H3: Individuals with lower government satisfaction are more inclined to participate in 
unconventional political activities, compared to individuals who have neutral feeling towards 
government or higher government satisfaction. 
 As governmental satisfaction is very low, it doesn’t explain the protest participation. 
Governmental satisfaction was very low among those who have protested, and those who 
haven’t. 
 
H4: Education doesn’t have a significant, positive correlation with political information; 
therefore, the uneducated, on average, are as politically informed as the educated. 
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 The results show that as education increases, so does the political information. However, 
income doesn’t predict information, even individuals with low income had high political 
information. People with no schooling, had mean information of .43 which one can argue that is 
relatively high.  
 
H6: Individuals in Kosovo are more inclined to protest about social and economic issues, such 
as education, healthcare, and the high unemployment rate, rather than the political situation. 
 Results showed that protest participation was high among both those who protest for 
economic issues and political issues.  
 
H7: Nationalism serves as a strong mobilizer of political protests in Kosovo. 
 The results from the issue data fail to confirm this hypothesis. However, the UNDP data 
fails to falsify this hypothesis, where protest participation potential is higher among those who 
think that the Special Court will decide indictment Against Kosovo Albanians, including current 
politicians who committed crimes. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 As mentioned earlier, there are no set variables that explain political behavior in different 
countries. Literature suggests several theories that try to describe the patterns of political 
behavior. Kosovo has a historical context, which throughout the years, empirically, it has shown 
to be influencing political participation. As suggested by the interviewees – people in Kosovo 
think that the right to vote shouldn’t be taken for granted; as for several decades they were 
disfranchised.  
 Neither grievance, nor resource mobilization, solely, can explain political participation in 
Kosovo. One theory does not outweigh another; rather they are complementary to each other. For 
example it is evident that grievance - dissatisfaction with government is high in Kosovo, 
however it doesn’t seem to have direct effect on political participation. Among the dissatisfied, 
there are people who protested and people who didn’t; numbers don’t vary to a large extent – 
those who protested are .2 higher than those who haven’t. It may be that dissatisfaction has led 
some to participation and some to political alienation. Grievance, however, indicated high protest 
potential. On the other hand, when looking at the resource mobilization, it appears that networks 
- discussing politics with others reduces the importance of having “material means”  for 
participation (as the SES models suggests) and it influences people in participating in 
unconventional political activities. Networks serve as agents in influencing people to participate, 
and income, and education fail to explain unconventional political participation when accounting 
for social networks. It is also found that although income and education matters when it comes to 
conventional political participation, mobilization serves as an agent that influences people to 
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participate in such political activities.  This could be explained by high clientelism, which exists 
in Kosovo. Political parties mobilize people during the election periods. Party militants then 
influence “their people” in their network, as this activity is then reward - party loyalty is 
rewarded.  
 Kosovo has a multi-party system and political parties influence political participation in 
Kosovo. As the governmental coalition changes, so do party alliances. For example, before the 
2016 PDK-LDK government was formed, LDK belonged to the VLAN coalition (now a group 
of opposition parties formed from Vetevendosje, AAK and Nisna) and its militants were 
influenced to participate in the anti-government protests. Now that LDK is part of the 
government, most of the LDK activists didn’t join the recently organized anti-government 
protests. As the governmental coalition change, political participation in Kosovo shifts. 
However, this mostly can be said about unconventional political participation; as when it comes 
to voting political parties mobilize their networks to have higher turnout. This can also be seen 
by high voting participation that was measured in this survey.  
 This research itself had its limitations, as the ISU Study in Kosovo didn’t have a great 
sample size and this was especially evident when conducting regression analysis. By contrast, 
the UNDP data included a great number of observations, but had no measure of conventional 
political participation and only a protest potential measure when it comes to unconventional 
political participation. The UNDP data results showed that satisfaction with economy, 
satisfaction with government and nationalism, which in this case they only measured the answers 
on the Supreme Court, showed that have high influence on protest potential. A suggestion would 
be to ask citizens directly whether they have participated in a protest rather than if they would 
pariticipate; because in a country with great social problems, such is Kosovo, the grievance 
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appears to be high and citizens claim that they would participate, because they have high 
grievance level. However, having high grievance not necessarily is translated into political 
activity. Also, it would be interesting to see whether people who have high grievance and 
participate in unconventional political activities, do so because political parties or other agents 
help translate this grievance in participation.  
 Research on political participation in Kosovo is lacking. A future study with larger 
sample size, that would include both measures of political participations and possibly expand 
them, would be beneficial to the general knowledge and in better understanding political 
participation pattern in Kosovo. 
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APPENDIX A 
SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
1. Sex                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
1.Male              2. Female                                                                                                                   
2. Age:___________ 
3. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently 
enrolled, highest degree received.                                                                                              
1.No schooling completed;  2.Primary School (or less); 
3.Some high school, no diploma;      4.High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent; 
5.Some college credit, no degree;       6. Trade/technical/vocational training;  
7.Associate degree; 8.Bachelor’s degree;   
9. Master’s degree; Professional degree; or Doctorate degree; 10.Other _____________ 
4.  Employment Status: Are you currently... 
 
1.Employed for wages;                2.Self-employed;                          3.Out of work and looking 
for work; 
4.Out of work but not currently looking for work;                    5.A homemaker; 
6.A student;               7.Military;              8.Retired;                9.Other________________ 
5. If not employed, for how many months/years have you been unemployed? Please 
write the number and circle one of the options.                                                                 
_____________ Months / Years  
6. If you are employed, which of the following most closely matches your job type?                                                                                                                                 
1.Manual labor; 2.Skilled labor; 3.Other __________  
7. How many hours per week do you usually work?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
1.35 hours a week or more; 2.Less than 35 hours a week; 3.I am not currently employed; 
4.Other _____ 
8.What category best describes your monthly income? 
1.150 – 300euro; 2. 300 – 500 euro; 3. 500-750 euro; 4.750-1000 euro; 5. more than 1000 
euro 
The following questions are regarding your political participation in conventional and 
unconventional 
activities, and we will ask your opinion regarding the efficacy of these political activities. 
9. Have you voted in the last national elections?                                                                                                                                                                                          
1.Yes 2.No  
10. What motivated you to vote? (Circle as many as applicable)                                                                                                                                                                 
1.Because I liked a candidate;                   2.It’s my civic duty;                  3.I disliked the 
previous prime-minister/mayor, so I didn’t want him to be re-elected;               4.Because my 
vote is expression of my choice;                    5.Because my vote, along with other, can affect 
the outcome of the election;              6.I Don’t know  
11. Do you believe that voting makes a difference?                                                                                                                                                                                                  
1. Yes      2. No 
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12. Please circle which option 
best represents your political 
activity.  
1. Very 
often 2.Often 
3.Sometim
es 4.Seldom 5.Never 
How often do you read about 
politics in the newspaper?           
How often do you discuss 
politics with other people?            
How often do you try to 
convince friends to vote the 
same as you?            
How often do you attend 
political meetings or rallies?            
How often do you spend time 
working for a political party or 
a candidate?            
13. Are you affiliated with any political party or political organization?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
1.Yes 2.No 
14. Which of the political ideologies below do you belong to? 
1. Far right 2.Right 3.Center 4.Left 5. Far left 6.I don’t belong to a political ideology 
15. Please check one of the 
options for each question 
below showing your approval 
of other people engaging in 
these activities for these 
political activities:  
1.Strong
ly 
approve 
2.Appro
ve 
3.Neither 
approve 
nor 
disapprov
e 
4. 
Disapprove 
5.Strongl
y 
disapprov
e 
Petition           
Protest           
Boycotts           
Strikes           
Painting Slogans           
Occupying Buildings           
16. Please check one of the 
options for each question 
below showing your 
participation in these 
unconventional political 
activities: 
1. Have 
done 
2. 
Haven't 
done but 
would 
do  
3. 
Undecided 
4.Might 
Do 
5.Would 
never di 
Petition           
Protest           
Boycotts           
Strikes           
Painting Slogans           
Occupying Buildings           
17. Please check one of the 
options for each question 
1.Very 
effective 
2. 
Effectiv
3.Somewh
at 
4. Not very 
effective 
5.Not at 
all 
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below showing your opinion 
on the effectiveness of these 
political activities:  
e effective effective 
Voting           
Petition           
Protest           
Boycotts           
Strikes           
Painting Slogans           
Occupying Buildings           
In this part of the survey we are interested to know your satisfaction with your life and with 
the government, so the following questions will be measuring your grievance.  
18. How much do you trust government to do what is right?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
1.Always                         2.Very often                            3.Sometimes                                
4.Rarely                   5.Never 
  
1.Very 
Satisfied 
2.Satisfi
ed 
3.Somewh
at satisfied 
4.Dissatisfi
ed 
5. Very 
Dissatisfi
ed 
19. All things considered, how 
satisfied or dissatisfied are 
you with your life in Kosovo?            
20. .Please check one of the 
options for each question 
below showing your 
satisfaction with the 
government work on the 
policy issues.            
Fighting Poverty            
Providing a good education           
Providing equal rights for 
ethnic minorities            
Looking after elderly           
Creating job opportunities for 
everyone           
21. If you had a chance, would you migrate from Kosovo?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
1. Yes         2. Maybe     3. No 
22. On scale 1-10, to what extent do you believe that each of these is a threat that Kosovo is 
facing? 
Economy and unemployment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Serbia 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Corruption 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Political Situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Other social issues (crime, 
drugs etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Religious Extremism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Other ________________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The following questions are regarding your nationality and ethnicity. 
23. On a scale from 1-10, 1 meaning that it does not at all describe you and 10 meaning that 
is describes you completely, to that extent does each nationality describe you? 
Kosovar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Albanian 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Serbian 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Turkish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bosnian 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Other_____________________
______ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
24. From scale 1-10, 1 being the lowest and 10 the highest, what ethnicity describes you the 
best? 
Kosovar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Albanian 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Serbian 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Turkish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bosnian 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Other_____________________
______ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
25. Do you agree with the term Kosovo describing your 
nationality?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
1. Yes              2.No                  3.I don't know           
The following questions are regarding political information 
and political knowledge. 
        
  
26. How often do you use the 
following sources 
1. 
Ever
y 
day   
2. Once 
a week 
3. Few 
times a 
week                      
4. Few 
times a 
month 5. Never 
Radio           
TV           
Newspaper           
Internet           
Friends and Family           
Meetings           
27. How informed do you believe you are about politics?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
1. Very well informed;                                                   2.Informed;                                                                            
3. Somewhat informed;                                                                                                                                     
4.Not informed;                                                              5. Not informed at all  
Now we would like to know how much information people in Kosovo are able to get about 
public affairs. Without looking it up, please answer the following questions. If you don’t 
know the answer, just leave the question blank 
28. Please write how long is the term for Prime Minister and MPs. 
______________________________________________________ 
29. Please write the unemployment rate in Kosovo. _____________________ 
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30. Which are the four biggest political parties in Kosovo? __________________ 
31. Whose responsibility is it to determine if the law is constitutional or not?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
1. Constitutional Court ;                                       2. Government;                                          
3.Parliament;                                             4.President 
32. Which party has the most seats in the Parliament? _______________ 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1) Based on your research and observations, are Kosovo citizens overall well informed 
politically? 
2) What are the main political messages that tend to mobilize citizens to vote? What do 
you believe are the main factors that lead citizens to vote? 
3) What do you believe are the reasons for low voting turnout? Why?  
4) Why do people in Kosovo protest? What do you believe are the main factors that lead 
citizens to protest?  
5) What are the main political messages that tend to mobilize citizens to protest, take 
part in demonstrations, or sign petitions?  
6) Do socio-economic factors have an impact on political participation in Kosovo? 
7) To your assessment, how satisfied are Kosovars with governmental performance? 
8) What is the impact of satisfaction with the governmental performance on political 
participation?  
9) What do you believe are the main causes of the out flux of emigration? 
10) What is your opinion regarding nationalism in Kosovo? To what extent does the term 
Kosovar appeal to the national identity of people living in Kosovo? 
11)  What do you think most people perceive as the biggest threat to our national 
identity? To what extent do you think these threats motivate people to participate in 
political activities? 
  
64 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
CORRELATIONS AND CHI SQUARE TESTS 
 
 
1. Correlations  
 
Correlation between protest and all independent variables 
 
 
Protest participation 
Income r=0.03 
Education r= 0.04 
Age r= -0.01 
Satisfaction with government r= -0.07 
Party Membership  r = 0.08 
Information Index  r=0.01 
Nationalism r= 0.03 
Discussing  politics  r= -0.21 
 
 
Correlation between voting and all independent variables 
 
Voting in national elections 
Income r= -0.11 
Education r= 0.29F 
Age r= -0.29 
Satisfaction with government r= - 0.09 
Party Membership  r= -0.19 
Information Index  r= - 0.13 
Nationalism r= 0.08 
Discussing politics r= 0.02 
 
 
2. Chi Square Tests  
 
Chi Square Tests between protest and all independent variables  
 
Protest participation 
Income Pearson chi2(4)= 1.46   Pr=0.83 
Education Pearson chi2(6)= 4.94   Pr=0.55 
Age Pearson chi2(3)= 3.45   Pr=033 
Party Membership  Pearson chi2(1)= 2.05   Pr=0.15 
Information Index  Pearson chi2(5)= 0.91   Pr=0.97 
Nationalism Pearson chi2(8)= 22.04   Pr=0.00 
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Discussing politics Pearson chi2(5)= 20.06   Pr=0.00 
 
 
Chi Square Tests between voting and all independent variables 
 
Voting in national elections 
Income Pearson chi2(4)= 27.93  Pr= 0.00 
Education Pearson chi2(6)=46.22   Pr =0.00 
Age Pearson chi2(6)=46.22   Pr =0.00 
Party Membership  Pearson chi2(1)=12.77   Pr =0.00 
Information Index  Pearson chi2(5)=14.94   Pr =0.01 
Nationalism Pearson chi2(9)= 11.58  Pr=0.24 
Discussing politics Pearson chi2(5)=20.166   Pr =0.00 
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APPENDIX D 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR EACH VARIABLE 
 
 
Logistic regressions of protest  
 
 
Protest and Income 
Protested Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
 income 0.04 0.13 0.33 0.74 -0.22 0.31 
 
 
 
 
Protest and Age 
Protested Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
       Age -0.01 0.01 -0.62 0.53 -0.02 0 
 
 
 
 
Protest and Education  
Protested Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
       Education 0.06 0.07 0.84 0.4 -0.08 0.19 
 
 
 
 
Protest and Party Membership  
Protested Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
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Party 
Membership 0.37 0.26 1.43 0.153 -0.14 0.89 
 
 
Protest and Satisfaction with government 
Protested Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
       Satisfaction 
with 
government  -0.18 0.13 -1.39 0.16 -0.44 0.08 
 
 
 
 
Protest and Nationalism  
Protested Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
       Nationalism  0.02 0.04 0.48 0.63 -0.05 0.09 
 
 
 
 
Protest and Information Index 
Protested Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
       Information 
Index  0.12 0.45 0.26 0.79 -0.77 1.01 
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Protest and Discussing politics 
Protested Coefficient Standard Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
       Discussing 
politics  -0.39 0.10 -3.94 0.00 -0.59 -.20 
 
 
 
Logistic regressions of voting  
 
Voting and Income 
Voting Coefficient 
Standard 
Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
       income 0.34 0.18 1.89 0.06 -0.01 0.69 
 
 
 
Voting and Age 
Voting Coefficient 
Standard 
Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
       Age 0.07 0.01 5.33 0 0.04 0.09 
 
 
Voting and Education 
Voting Coefficient 
Standard 
Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
       Education 0.42 0.08 5.23 0 0.26 0.58 
 
 
 
Voting and Party Membership 
Voting Coefficient 
Standard 
Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
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Party 
Membership  1.41 0.42 3.36 0.001 0.59 2.23 
 
 
 
 
Voting and Satisfaction with government  
Voting Coefficient 
Standard 
Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
       Satisfaction 
with 
government  0.28 0.15 1.83 0.07 -0.02 0.58 
 
 
 
 
Voting and Nationalism  
Voting Coefficient 
Standard 
Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
       Nationalism  -0.06 0.04 -1.41 0.16 -0.15 0.02 
 
 
 
Voting and Information Index  
Voting Coefficient 
Standard 
Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
       Information 
Index 1.17 0.49 2.42 0.02 0.22 2.13 
 
 
 
Voting and Discussing Politics  
Protested Coefficient 
Standard 
Error z P>z 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] Interval] 
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Discussing 
politics  -0.42 0.11 -3.82 0.00 -0.64 -.21 
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APPENDIX E  
 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL 
 
 
